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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREMIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
2
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.3,
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.
4
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
5
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
6
ADMIRALTY.
Collision-Practice.-The doctrine, over and over again ruled by this
court, that when in admiralty cases involving questions of fact alone,
the District and Circuit Courts have both found in one way, every pre-
sumption is in favor of the decrees, and that there will be no reversal
here unless for manifest error, again declared: The S. B. Whedltci 20
Wall.
Whether the absence of a lookout at the bow of a sailing-vessel,
though at night, was or was not a contributing fault to a collision, is a
question of thct, and where on a libel for a collision both the District
and the Circuit Courts have held that it was not, the general rule of
practice just above stated, as to the effect of decisions by the two courts
in one way, applies : Id.
ASSUMPSIT.
Waiv'er of Fraud and Action for Money had, &c.-Where one fraud-
ulently exhibiting to another a sealed instrument reciting that the
person exhibiting it has a claim for a sum of money on a third party
(he having no claim whatsoever), fraudulently induces that other to
uy it from him, and such other buying it, pays him in money for it, and
takes an assignment under seal on the back of the instrument, the
person thus defrauded may recover his money in assumpsit, on a decla-
ration containing special counts setting out the instrument as induce-
ment, and averring the utter falsity of its recitations, and the fraud of
the whole transaction; the declaration containing also the common
counts: Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall.
ATTACHMENT.
Defence by Garnishee-Ezemption of Debtors' Property from Execu-
tion-Yot ice to Debtor-Laws of other States-Presumption as to- Cor-
poration.-A garnishee who knows that the property of the attachment
debtor in his possession, or the money which he owes such debtor, is by
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in vol. 20 of his Reports.
2 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 40 Md. Reports.
3 From Hoyt Post, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 30 or 31 Mich. Reports.
4 From G. D.W.Vroom, Esq, Reporter; to appear in vol. 8 of his Reports.
5 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 75 Pa. State Reports.
6 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 35 or 36 Wis. Reports.
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law exempt from attachment and execution, must bring that fact to the
notice of the court : otherwise the judgment against such garnishee, and
satisfaction thereof, will not bar an action against him by the attach-
ment debtor. So held in a case where the principal debtor was not per-
sonally served with process in the attachment suit, and had no notice
either of that suit or of the proceeding in garnishment: Pierce v. The C.
& N. IV. Railway Company, 35 or 36 Wis.
Under the laws of -Wisconsin, "the earnings of all married persons or
persons who have to provide for the entire support of a family," in this
state for the sixty days next preceding the issue of any process against
them, are exempt ftom levy, seizure or sale upon such process, and can-
not be garnished on attachment. And it seens that where that question
arises in any case, it must be presumed, in the absence of proof, that the
laws of Illinois are similar to our own in that respect: Id.
Where a corporation existing under the laws both of Wisconsin and
of another state, has been garnisheed in the latter state, in an attach-
ment suit against a resident of Wisconsin, and has suffered and satisfied
a judgment against it as garnishee, and is afterwards sued in Wisconsin
by the attachment defendant, for the same property or indebtedness for
which it was thus garnisheed, it must be treated in such action as a do-
mestic corporation, and presumed to know the exemption laws of Wis-
consin: Id.
In such case the proceedings in attachment being ez parte, without
service of process on the attachment debtor or notice to him of the ac-
tion, it is the duty of the garnishee corporation, in order to protect itself,
to notify the debtor of the pendency of the proceedings in garnishment,
and request him to defend: Id.
Whether the rules above stated would be different with respect to a
merely foreign corporation, is not here decided,: Id.
BROKeE.
Carrying Stock-Not bound to keep ont Hand the identical Shares.-
Where a broker agrees to carry for and on account of a customer, for the
period of twelve months, a certain number of shares of railroad stock, at
a specified price per share, he is not bound to retain in his possession
during the pendency of the carrying contract, the identical stock which
he agreed to carry; he may sell the whole or any part thereof; all that
the law requires of him is, that during the pendency of the contract he
should have on hand, in his possession, or under his control, an equal
number of other shares of the same stock, ready for delivery when his
customer should pay what he owed on account thereof, or to be sold on
his account when he should so direct: Price v. Gover, 40 Md.
BUILDING ASSOCIATION.
Rule for ascertaining the true Amount due under .M'ortgages held by a
Building .Assoiation.-Where a Building Association is prematurely
dissolved, and .the mortgages held by it! against the members whose
shares of stock had been redeemed by loans or advances, are foreclosed,
in determining -the true amount due under such mortgages, the mort-
gagors should be allowed, not only for the sums paid by them as weekly
dues, but also for-what they paid as interest; while they are to be charged
interest at the rate ofix .6per cent. per annum on the sums advanced by
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the Association, and so from time to time on the balance of such sums,
after deducting therefrom the moneys paid by them for weekly dues and
interest. On the payment of the balance due upon their mortgages, thus
ascertained, they will be entitled to have the same released : Windsor v.
Bandel, 40 Nd.
CATTLE. See Distress.
CERTIORARI. See Practice.
CompxRomxrsE. See Fraud.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See National Bank; _avigable 11iaters.
.Municipal Corporation-Power to make Ordinances and prescribe
Fines and Imprisonment for Violation-Crininal Law-Regulation of
Selling Liqnor is within Police Power-Offence against two A uthorities by
the same Act.-The 18th section of the charter of the city of Plainfield,
giving to the Common Council the power to prescribe, by ordinance, fines
and penalties for the violation of any of its ordinances, with the proviso that
the amount of fine shall in no case exceed one hundred dollars, or the
term of imprisonment twenty days, preserving the right of trial by jury
if demanded by the defendant in all cases, where the punishment pre-
scribed may be imprisonment or the amount of fine exceed twenty dol-
lars, is not unconstitutional: William -Hone v. The Treasurer of Plain-
field, 8 Vroom.
The provision of the state Constitution which ordains that the right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, is substantially the same as that
upon the same subject contained in the Constitution of 1776, and neither
was intended to extend the right of trial by jury to cases where it did
not previously attach : Id.
The case of Jfc Gear v. Woodruff, 4 Vroom 213, approved : Id.
The same act may constitute an offence both against the state and
municipal corporation, and both may punish without violation of any
constitutional principle : Id.
The unlawful retailing of intoxicating drinks or the keeping of tip-
pling-houses, are not included in the category of criminal offences, the
punishment of which cannot, constitutionally, be delegated by the legis-
lature to a municipality, as offences cognisable by it under the powers
of police : Id.
CONTRACT. See Deed; Fraud; Partnership.
Settlernent-Estoppel-N~egligence.-This was an action to recover
money earned under a contract for running logs. The contract provided
that Milliken should run the logs for himself and three other firms, of
which plaintiffs in error were one. Milliken was to receive a per diem
allowance, and the expenses of driving the logs were to be equalized,
each owner to furnish his share of men and outfit, and at the close of
the work there was to be a final settlement. Each owner was bound to
furnish his wood scale, specifying the number of his logs, and the pro-
portion of men and provisions, &c., was to be estimated from this, and
each was to pay his own men. An account of time was to be kept by
I illiken, and in the settlement each who had furn'ished a surplus was to
be credited, and each one short was to be charged his deficiency. Held,
That while the contract was for some purposes mutual, it was in the main
one whereby each owner beame severally responsible for any liability
to respond: Stewart et al. v. Milliken, 30 or 31 Mich.
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A settlement was made, at which Stewart, one of the plaintiffs in
error, was present, but Smith, the other, was not. It was postponed for
a while, as Stewart said Smith knew most about the facts, but Smith re-
fused to attend. A statement was furnished to plaintiffs in error, and
no subsequent objection was made until after suit was brought. Held,
That the contract contemplated a settlement immediately on the close of
the business, and this settlement was necessary to ascertain the exact
liability of all the parties, and that as the expenses were to be ratably
divided, it was essential it should be made once for all, since it could not
.afterwards be disturbed without affecting every party to the contract;
that it was made the duty of each to be prepared in season with a state-
nient of what he had furnished, and to use diligence in enabling an ad-
justment to be made; that the only course was for the parties te make
such settlement as they could, and that unless specified objections were
made within a reasonable time, it would be unjust to permit such settle-
ment to be attacked after every one had been compelled to act upon it
or leave the accounts without any settlement: Rd..
The jury were directed that, unless impeached for fraud or mistake,
a settlement so made and furnished must stand, if not objected to within
reasonable time. Held, That this ruling was not open to objection by
plaintiffs in error, and that it was quite favorable enough ; that they
should be held estopped by a much less degree of negligence than would
have been pardonable if there were no third parties involved in the set.
tlement, with whom Milliken had to close his accounts: 17.
New Terms-Cosideration-Corporation-Authoritzy of Officers-
An agreement to engraft new terms upon an existing contract, is not
binding if without consideration: Titus and Scudder v. The Cairo and
Fulton 1. 1R. Co., 8 Yroom.
The authority of G. to sell bonds of the company will not be inferred
from his position as director of the company, nor from the fact that the
president of the company gave him a power of attorney to sell. The
authority of the president to execute such power of attorney must be
shown : Id.
CORPORATION. See Attachment; Contract.
COVENANT. See Deed.
-CRIMINAL CONVERSATION.
azrriage-Evidnce-Damage.-In an action for criminal conversa-
tion an actual marriage must be proved: H ttchins v. Kimmel, 30 or 31
TMich.
Proof of a ceremony of marriage in a foreign state, followed by co-
habitation as man and wife, will be presumed a valid marriage by the
law of the foreign state: R.
Conduct of plaintiff on learning of his wife's offence is admissible iu.
evidence on the subject of damages: 11.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Constitutional Law.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
.Fraudulent S7e.-Where the question was, whether a sale of chattels
was fraudulent as against a creditor, there was no error in refusing to
instruct the jury, that " the conveyance of the whole property of a
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debtor affords a very violent presumption of a fraudulent intent so far as
existing creditors are concerned : Bigelow v. Doolittle, Sherff, 35 or 36
Wis.
The fact that a debtor has conveyed all his property to another person
is a circumstance to be considered by the jury in connection with all the
other facts of the case, in determining whether the sale was fraudulent;
and it is for the jury to determine, in view of all those facts, whether
such conveyance is a violent or only a slight indication of fraud: Id.
DEED.
Covenant-Condition-Specific Performance.-Complainant deeded
to the Ionia & Lansing Railroad Company in June 1870, certain ground
on his farm for a track and depnt, in consideration of $500 and the
covenant to build a depot set forth in the deed. Following the descrip-
tion of property in this deed was this clause: "But this conveyance is
made upon the express consideration that said railroad company shall
build, erect and maintain a depot or station-house on the land herein
described, suitable for the convenience of the public, and that at least
one train each way shall stop at such depot or station each day when
trains run on said road, .ind that freight and passengers shall be regu-
larly taken at such depot." The deed was otherwise in usual form. The
bill is for the specific performance of this clause, or for compensation in
damages. The defendant claims that this clause constitutes not a cove-
nant, but a condition subsequent, and that the complainant is not en-
titled to the relief prayed. Held, 1. That the rule for holding in doubt-
Aful cases that a clause is a covenant and not a condition, where the
grantor maintains that it is a condition, which is based on the idea that
a condition as tending to destroy the estate would be less favorable to
the grantee, does not apply here, where the grantee insists that it is a
condition ; that the position of these parties confounds the reason of
such rule and would dispense with the rule itself if the case were a
doubtful one: Blanehard v. Detroit, &c., Railroad Co., 30 or 31 Mich.
FReld, 2. That the fact that one of the parties is a natural and the
other an artificial person, gives no significance whatever to the legal
merits, nor does it in any manner bear upon the proper exposition and
application of the controlling principles: Id.
,tel, 3. That in construing this clause it must be given effect accord-
inR to the legal interpretation and meaning of its terms, and not accord-
ing to any erroneous impression either party may have formed respecting
its operation ; and that the fact that this clause is referred to in the
consideration clause and called a covenant will not control the proper
meaning and nature of the terms actually used in the clause in question,
at least not where that meaning is clear and unambiguous on its face: _11.
Held, 4. That the clause in question is clear and unambiguous, and
is a condition subsequent and not a covenant; and that where there is
no imposition, fraud or mistake, the party who deliberately makes a con-
dition, and nothing but a condition, cannot change its character by
asserting that he meant it should be a covenant: Id.
.ield, 5. That the requirements of the writing in question are not of
such a nature, or so fully and clearly marked out, defined, identified or
indicated as to make specific execution by the court practicable ; that
the court has no power to execute the requirements, which are leading
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nbjects of the provision, for stopping trains and receiving and discharg-
ing freight and passengers, and has no machinery by which it could
superintend and supervise the business of running trains on defendant's
road and cause the requirements to be carried out; and that the want
of details and the lack of particularity and specification would alone
precludei specific performance; and some of the particulars in which the
writing is wanting in this respect are specified and pointed out in the
opinion: Id.
Held, 6. That the alternative relief prayed for by way of allowance of
damages in the nature of compensation is inadmissible; that the uncer-
tainties and lack of details which mark the case would be an obstacle
to the granting of this relief; and that a full and complete award for
refusing to perform a series of daily acts to extend through all the future
would be impossible upon any data afforded by the case; and that a
partial award, for present damages, would be not only futile, but would
be an unwarrantable departure from principle: Id.
DISTRESS.
Cattle doing Damage on the Highway.-Oattle doing damage on the
highway were not distrainable at the common law, or at least were not
distrainable after the passage of the statute of Marlborough, A. D. 1267:
Taylor v. Welbey, 35 or 36 Wis.
The statute of this state on the subject is a complete revision of the
whole law of distress damage feasant, and takes the place of all former
laws on that subject: Id.
The statute limits the right to the distraining of beasts doing
damage within the enclosure of the distrainor (Tay. Stats. 793, § 1) ; and
the word "1 enclosure" there means a tract of land surrounded by an
actual fence, together with such fence, and does not include that part of
a public highway of which the fee belongs to the owner of such adjoin-
ing enclosure: .ld.
A by-law of a town prohibiting cattle from running at large, and in-
flicting a pecuniary penalty upon the owner of cattle violating the law,
confers no right upon the owner in fee of land included in a highway
in such town, to distrain cattle grazing upon such highway: Id.
Plaintiff having, without legal authority, distrained defendant's cattle
as damage feasant, defendant had a right peaceably to reclaim them;
and even if he reclaimed them forcibly, plaintiff could not maintain
replevin against him for the cattle : Id.
EQUITY. See Deed; Surety; Trust.
ESTOPPEL. See Contract.
EVIDENCE.
Power of Courts to order Inspection of Papers.-At common law and
independently of recent statutes, courts of! law had the power to order
inspection of papers, which, by the pleadings or by being used in the
evidence, came within the control of the court. But the court in exer-
cising this control over papers, will merely grant inspection and exam-
ination by the party and his witnesses, either in open court or before an
officer of the court, or in the presence of the party producing them or
his attorney, and will not take them from the latter and deliver them
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into the possession of the other side : ifillyard v. Township of Harrison,
8 Vroom.
Quere: Who is entitled to the custody of the duplicate of -assessment
of taxes, and the tax warrant issued for unpaid taxes, after the collector
of taxes is out of office: Rd.
.a ame as Evidence of fdentity of Persons.-Plaintiff's name was John
Gottlieb Kimmel, his wife was known as Philopena Kimmel, and there
was evidence that her maiden" name was Utz. In an action for criminal
conversation in which it was necessary to prove actual marriage, a certi-
ficate of marriage in Wurtemberg between John Gottlieb Kimnel and
Sabrina Philopena Utz was held to be evidence of the marriage, without
other identification of the persons: Eutchins v. Kimmel, 30 or 31 Mich.
FEDERAL COURTS. See Limitations.
FISHERY. See Navigable Waters.
FOREIGN CORPORATION. See Limitations.
FOREIGN LAW. See Attachment ; Husband and Wife.
FRAUD. See Assumpsit ; Debtor and Creditor.
Representations-Reliance U'pon-Compromise-Rescissio of Con-
tract.-T. and W., being partners in the drug business, entered into an
agreement for the dissolution of the partnership, by which W. was to
take all the assets, with certain exceptions, pay all debts of the firm ap-
pearing on its books, and a few others mentioned, with the taxes then as-
sessed on the property, and pay plaintiff_ $8000, viz., $5000 down, and
the remainder, with interest, in sixty days; and T. covenanted not to
carry on the same business within certain limits, during a term, of
five years. There were also some other. covenants, and mutual re-
leases. In this action byT. to recover the-unpaid balance of $3000 and
interest, W. set up both as a defence and as a ground of counterclaim,
false and fraudulent representations made to him by T. during the pen-
dency of the negotiations, as to the value of the stock in trade and bank
-credits of the firm, the debts due it, and the debts which it owed, and
as to the correctness of the books of account of the firm, kept by T.
field, That such defence or counterclaim could not be maintained with-
out showing that W. relied upon, said representations of T., and exe-
cuted the agreement on the faith thereof: Van Trott v. Weisse, 35 or
36 Wis.
The agreement aforesaid was entered into on the 2d of July 1873.
On the 19th of May previous W. had commenced an action against T.
for the dissolution of the partnership and a settlement of its affairs,
praying for an injunction, receiver, and accounting. The verified com-
plaint in such action alleged that the stock of goods was then worth, as
near as W. could ascertain, between $12,000 and $14,000, and that the
debts due the firm amounted to at least 83000; and it charged T. with
embezzlement of large sums of money of the firm, and with making
fraudulent entries and omissions in the account books of the firm, so as
to conceal such embezzlement and make the value of the stock in trade
appear largely in excess of its real value, &e. T. answered said com-
plaint, denying the alleged frauds; and pending that action, the parties
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negotiated for a settlement of their partnership affairs, which resulted
in the aforesaid agreement of July 2d; and said action of W. was dis-
continued (pursuant to such agreement), without costs to either party.
Upon these facts appearing in the present action, held, that it sufficiently
appears that plaintiff could not have relied on fraudulent representations,
which were in direct conflict with his sworn complaint then on file. He*
had no right to be misled by them, and cannot be heard to aver that
he was so misled : Id.
As all the fraudulent representations now alleged relate to the same
'subjects, and are of the same character as those alleged in the action of
May 19th, and were the subject of compromise in the agreement of July
2d, here sued on, and no new element of fraud has intervened, the con-
troversy concerning them was for ever closed by such agreement. Id.
A party who seeks to rescind an entire contract for fraud of the other
party thereto, must return, or offer to return, whatever he has received
under it. He must rescind in toto, if at all : id.
In an action for the price of goods sold, defendant may plead as a
defence or counterclaim, that he purchased the goods on the faith of
fraudulent reprcsentations made by the vendor, as to the quality, condi-
tion, &c., of the goods. But this was not such a case: Id.
The consideration of defendant's covenant (here sued on) was, not
only the sale to him of plaintiff's interest in nearly all the assets of the
firm, but also the other stipulations and covenants of plaintiff in the
written agreement aforesaid. Defendant, on several occasions, requested
plaintiff "to take back the store at $9000," i. e. to repay defendant the
$5000 paid down, and cancel the covenantito pay the $3000; but he did
vot offer to cancel the said written agreement. Held, That for this
reason, also, the defendant cannot maintain his defence or counter-
claim : Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Parol Contract for the Sale of a grozoing Peach rop.-By parol con-
tract, the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant, and the defendant
agreed to purchase from the plaintiff, the peaches then growing in the
peach orchard of the plaintiff, at and for a specified sum, the defendant
to gather and remove the peaches as they matured. The defendant or
his agent at the time of the purchase, paid the plaintiff a portion of the
purchase money, and a further portion before any peaches were gathered,
and gathered said peaches from the orchard as they matured, and
removed the same. In an action brought for the balance of the
purchase-money, it was Held: 1st. That the plaintiff was entitled to
recover. 2d. That the contract was not invalid under the operation of
the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds: Purner v. Piercy, 40 Md.
A sale of any growing produce of the earth, in actual existence at the
time of the contract, whether it be in a state of maturity or not, is not
to be considered a sale of an interest in or concerning land: Id.
Delivery of Goods.-If the purchaser of goods under an agreement
otherwise void by the Statute of Frauds, accepts a delivery of the goods or
some part of them, either when the agreement is made or afterwards,
such agreement thereby becomes a valid contract: Anson v. Dreher, 35
or 36 Wis.-
In an action for the price of three casks of wine alleged to have been
shipped by plaintiffs in New York to defendant in Milwaukee, on his
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order (such price being over fifty dollars), there was conflicting evidence
as to whether defendant ordered more than one cask, and also as to
whether he did not subsequently accept a delivery of the three casks at
place where they had been stored in Milwaukee. Held, That if there
was such an acceptance, neither the Statute of Frauds nor the alleged ex-
cess of plaintiffs in filling the order was of any importance; and the
court properly refused a nonsuit, and submitted the, question of accept-
ance to the jury: Id.
GROWING CROPS. See Frauds, Statute of.
HIGHWAY. See Distress.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Trust.
.larriage-Presumption as to Law of Foreign State.-A marriage valid
where it is celebrated as a general rule is valid everywhere, and one void
where celebrated void everywhere: .Hutchins v. Kimmel, 30 or 31 Mich.
If a marriage takes place in this state, evidence that a ceremony was
performed ostensibly in celebration of it, with the apparent assent and
co-operation of the parties, is evidence of a marriage, even though it
falls short of showing that the statutory regulations were complied with,
or affirmatively shows that they were not : Id.
A formal ceremony of marriage, whether in due form or not, must be
assumed to be by consent and therefore prima facie a ec.tract of mar-
riage per verba de presenti; and marriage between parties capable of
contracting it, being of common right and valid by a common law pre-
vailing throughout Christendom, and regulations restrictive of this right
and imposing conditions upon it being exceptional, the burden of proving
that What is a sufficient common-law marriage is not a valid marriage
where celebrated, in a case where the local law is not shown, is on the
party claiming that the case falls within such exceptional regulations,
and it will not be presumed where a marriage prima facie good is shown,
that there are regulations restrictive of the common right, until they
are shown : Id.
The presumption that the common law as it exists here prevails in a
foreign counitry, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is applicable to
all marriages celebrated in Christian countries, and especially in a case
where the parties, after taking such steps abroad to constitute a mar-
riage as would be sufficient under our laws, remove afterwards to this
country, and in apparent reliance upon the marriage and the protection
our laws would give it, continue for many years to live together as hus-
band and wife : Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See Constitutional Law.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Surety.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Foreign Corporation cannot take Advantage of in NAew ork-Federat
and State Courts.-The highest courts of New York, construing the
statutes of limitation of that state, have decided that a foreign corpora-
tion cannot avail itself of them ; and this, notwithstanding such corpora-
tio was the lessee of a railroad in New York, and had property within
the state, and a managing agent residing and keeping an office of the
company: Tioga R. R. v. B. & C. R. R., 20 Wal'
VOL. XXIII.-33
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These decisions upon the construction of the statutes are binding upon
this court, whatever it may think of their soundness on general prin-
ciples : Id.
MARaIAGE. See Husband and Wfe.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law.
Assessments for Improvemets-Interest.-Where bonds have been
sold by a city to raise money in anticipation of a street improvement,,
and the proceeds in the mean time have been used by the city for other
purposes, it is not lawful to include interest during that time, in the
estimate of the expense of the improvement to be assessed on the land-
owners : State, Benry ff. Bat-r, et al., pros., v. The City of Elizabeth,
8 Vroom.
If bonds have been sold by legislative authority at less than par, the
discount can be included in the estimate: Al.
Street Improvements-Assessments.-A provision in the Jersey City
charter of 1871, section 48, that each lot shall be assessed for the labor
and materials necessary to grade the street in front of it, and for its
share of the intersections, and to be credited for the materials taken in
front of it, and proportionally from any neighboring intersection, is in
total disregard of the well established doctrine that the assessment shall
not exceed the benefits, and an assessment made thereunder must be set
aside: State, Van Tassel, et al., pros., v. The Mayor and Aldermen of
Jersey City, 8 Vroom.
A supplement (Laws, 1873, p. 405, sec. 21) providing that in making
any assessment for improvements under section 48 of the original act,
the expenses of excavating rock and all other excavation shall be assessed
upon "all the property benefited by such excavation, and to be assessed
for said improvement;" also, fails to recognise the principle of benefits
entirely, for it still limits the property to be assessed to that which was
to be assessed by the charter. It was not intended by that clause to
enlarge the limits of the property to be assessed, but only within the
same limits to have the expense assessed according to benefits, and thus
making all the property on the frontage liable to pay the whole cost of
the excavations. An assessment under that provision is illegal: Id.
There is no valid objection against assessing the cost of flagging side-
walks on the principle of frontage, but under such a power the estimate
must not include any part of the expense of substantial grading (excava-
tion and filling) of that part of the street occupied by the sidewalks.
Incidental grading for the mere purpose of flagging may be included,
but not the substantial grading of any part of the street, although in-
cluded in the sidewalks: Id.
-Liability for Acts of its Offiers-WNegligence.-A servant was driving
his master's horse on a street of a city faster than was permitted by the
ordinance; he and the horse were taken into custody by the police, by
negligence the horse escaped and was killed. Held, That the city was
not responsible for the negligence of the police: Elliott v. a'ity of Phila-
delphia, 75 Pa.
In order to charge a municipal corporation for negligence in the per-
formance of a public work, the law must have imposed a duty on it so
as to make the neglect culpable: d.
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Tile officers of a city are quasi civil officers of the government, al-
though appointed by the corporation : ld.
Where a city only authorizes a lawful act to be done in a lawful man-
ner, it is not responsible for acts of its officers outside of the authority:
.d.
Assessments for Improvements of Streets.--An assessment made un-
der charter of-village of Passaic, which provides that the whole cost of
the improvement shall be assessed upon lands fronting on the improve-
ment, in proportion to the benefit received by each lot, is illegal, as it
requires such lots to bear the whole burthen of the cost without limita-
tion to actual benefits, and the mode of its distribution merely, being
according to benefits: State, Th7e Delaware, Lackawana & lWestern R.
1. Co., pros. v. .The Village of Passaic, 8 Vroom.
Since the case of Agens v. Thie City of Newark, in Court of Errors,
an assessment for an improvement of this character (grading) cannot be
sustained where made according to a statute fixing a standard otherwise
than actual benefits, and limited only by political territorial divisions, if
the legislature choose to make any such limitation : 11.
Section 48 of the charter of the city of Passaic, (Acts of 1873,) is
only intended to validate proceedings not done in conformity to the Act
of 1869, the same as if it had been complied with, and to impose upon
the land-owners the onus of showing that the assessment, as to benefits,
had not been made according to that act, and not that it exceeds the
actual benefits: Id.
NA ieE. See Evidence.
NATIONAL BANK.
Attachment on Warrant issued by a State Court, illegal- Validify of
see. 2 of the Act of Congress of .Aarch 3d 1873.-An attachment on
warrant issued by a state court to affect the funds of a national bank is
illegal and void, being in violation of section 57 of the Act of Congress,
ch. 106, approved June 3d 1864, as amended by section 2 of the Act
of Congress, ch. 269, approved March 3d 1873: Chesapeake Bank v.
First National Bank of Baltimore, Garnishee, 40 Md.
The second section of the Act of Congress, ch. 269, approved March
3d 1873, amending section 57 of the Act of Congress, ch. 106, ap-
proved June 3d 1864, is constitutional and valid, being a provision to
promote the efficiency of the national banks in performing the functions
by which they were designed to serve the government, and to protect
them not only against interfering state legislation, but also against suits
or proceedings in state courts, by which their efficiency would be im-
paired: Id.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
Rights of Fishery-Grant of Right to Citizens- Tiepass.-Fishing
for oysters in the navigable waters of this state is a right common to all
its citizens, which may be exercised by them at will, except so far as it
is restrained by positive law: Paul et al. v. Hazleton, 8 Vroom.
The legislature may grant the right to plant oysters in the bed of
the navigable streams to one citizen, to the exclusion of others : Id.
Section 1 of the Supplement to the Oyster Law, approved March 9th
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1855 (Nix. Dig. 134, pl. 26) gives such exclusive right to the adjacent
land-owner when he stakes it off in good faith for planting. But it is
a mere license to the land-owner, subject to revocation : M.
The action of trespass will be fibr an invasion of this right: -P.
Trespass by Vessl-Right of Fishery.-A, vessel ran into a net laid
in a private fishery in a navigable stream and damaged it. field, That
the captain was liable, if upon being warned he could have changed his
course without prejudice to the reasonable prosecution of his voyage:
Cobb v. Bennett, 75 Pa.
What would be a reasonable prosecution of a voyage depended upon
the attendant circumstances : Md.
A vessel may hold her course in a navigable stream without regard to
a fisherman's net, if the master act without wantonness or malice and do
no unnecessary damage: Rd.
Fishery is an acknowledged right, but is subordinate to the rights of
navigation: Md.
Wantonness is reckless sport, wilfully unrestrained action, running
immoderately into excess: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Contract; Municipal Corporation.
Hired Horses-Thnkeepers--Evid(enee-Statements of Agent-Liability
for Orerdriving a Hired Horse.--Fay recovered judgment fbr the value
of a horse hired by Ruggles for a journey from Manistee to Pentwater
and not returned. The horse died the next day after reaching Pentwater,
and the loss was claimed to have occurred from neglect in proper treat-
ment, or from overdriving, or from both. Evidence was received against
objection tlhat on the morning after the arrival at Pentwater the driver
said "that lie supposed the horse had been driven too hard from Alanis-
tee the day before, but that he had driven according to instructions-"
feld, That this was inadmissible, as being a statement by a third person
and not the defendant, and a narrative of a past transaction; that it was
no part of the res gestm because the person making it was not in the
performance of any duty which called for it, and that it was hearsay
and improper: Rugglesv. Fay, 30 or 31 Mich.
The court refused to charge that when the team was intrusted to the
innkeeper-the driver putting up at the inn-tle innkeeper became
responsible for careful keeping, and that if the horse died through his
neglect defendant would not be liable, and charged that he would be
liable if the horse died from negligent treatment at Pentwater. Held,
That it is very generally to be expected that horses may safely be in-
trusted to the care of innkeepers and owners of innstables, but that
whether it would be prudent to do so in a given case nmust depend upon
circumstances ; that the driver as representing defendant was bound to
use such prudence and oversight as would be usual under the circum-
stances, and no more, and that the only safe rule is to leave it t6 the
jury to determine on the whole facts whether or not there was any
fiilure on the part of defendant, or his servant, to do what he should be
expected to do as a man of common prudence : Id.
The court also refused to charge that if the jury should find the horse
was driven in the time and by the way and by the driver agreed upon,
and was overdriven because his master agreed that he should perform a
greater service than he was equal to perform, the plaintiff could not
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recover. There was evidence from which it is claimed it might be found
that the plaintiff was infornied that defendant must reach Pentwater by
a given time to take the cars. Held, That the owner of a team cannot
complain of parties who do no more than was agreed .upon, and that if
the evidence would warrant a finding of such an arrangement the charge
should have been given : Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Cknstruction of Contract.-H. and S. entered into business October
1st 1871, to continue until April 1st 1875, unless, at the expiration of
eighteen months from the former date, the business did not pay its own
expenses, in which event S. was to have the right to close it after that
time. The entire working capital, $5000, was furnished by S. It ap-
pearing that on the 8th of August 1872, this working capital was lost.
Reld, That S. was not obliged to furnish more capital or to pledge his
credit in the prosecution of the business, and that he might therefore
terminate the agreement August 8th 1872, subject to his liability to
pay H. wages to April 1st 1873 : Hill v. Smalley, 8 Vroom.
PRACTICE.
Appearance- Waiver of Technical Objections-Certiorari.-The ob-
ject of a warrant is to bring the party defendant into court, and if legally
insufficient for that purpose, objection should be made to it before the
defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and goes to
trial on the merits of the case: Clfford v. The Overseer of the Poor, 8
Vroom.
The general appearance of the defendant is a waiver of all objections
to the form of the process and the manner of its service : Id.
Before this court can interfere on certiorari with a matter confided to
the discretion of the court below, it must be clearly shown that there
has been an unwarrantable and illegal exercise of such discretion to the
substantial injury of the party complaining: Id.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Practice-Bill of Exceptions-Plaintiff and Defendant.-In deter.
mining a question whether a Circuit Court had erred in denying a
mdtion to remand a case removed to it from the state court, and giving
judgment as if the case had been rightly removed to it, this court cannot
pay any attention to a certificate of the clerk of such Circuit Court,
certifying that on the hearing of the motion in the Circuit Court certain
things "appeared," "were proved," or "were admitted," or "agreed
to" by the parties respectively; such facts not appearing by bill of ex-
ception nor by any case stated. Neither party can gain any advantage
by such a statement: Evapp v. Railroad Company, 
20 Wall.
The Act of Congress of March 2d 1867, allowing'.- either of the par-
ties to a suit-they being of a certain class described-to remove it
from a state court into the Circuit Court of the United States, does not
change the previously existing and settled rules which determine who
are to be regarded as the plaintiff and defendant: 1d.
Hence, where two persons in one state, trustees for bondholders of a
mortgage of a railroad owned by a company in another, foreclosed the
mortgage, bought in the road in trust for the bondholders, and then
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leased it to a citizen of the state to which they themselves belonged, and
then a majority of the bondholders in the state where the original com-
pany was, in pursuance of a statute there, formed themselves into a new
corporation, to which the statute gave ownership and control of the
road, and suit was brought in a state court against the lessee of the road
by the trustees who had made the lease, H7eW, that the defendant could
not remove the suit from the state court to the Federal court on the
ground that it was wholly between the new corporation and the lessee,
and that the trustees were now merely nominal parties ; they, the trus-
tees, not having been been discharged from, or in any way incapacitated
-from executing their trust, and there having been, in fact, unpaid bond-
holders who had not joined in the creation of the new corporation, and
who had yet a right to call on the trustees to provide for the payment of
their bonds: Id.
SALE. See Fraud
Warranty of Title- Chattel Mortgage-Rescisson-Damages.-This
was an action on the common counts in assupipsit, commenced in a jus-
tice's court and brought by appeal to the Circuit, and there tried by
jury resulting in a judgment for plaintiff for $150. Plaintiff and de-
fendant traded horses, plaintiff giving his horse and a yearling colt for
defendant's horse and $10. Possession was mutually given and the
$10 paid. The horse received by plaintiff was afterwards taken
from him on a chattel mortgage given prior to the exchange.
The main question is whether the plaintiff without rescinding the
contract or offering to place the defendant in statu quo was entitled
to recover under the common count for goods sold and delivered, the
value of the horse and colt less the $10. Held, 1. That the horse re-
ceived by plaintiff being at the time of the trade in defendant's posses-
sion, a warranty of title on defendant's part was implied in the exchange,
as it would be on a sale, and plaintiff might have sued upon that con-
tract, of which the warranty was a part; and that in thus doing he would
be affirming instead of rescinding the trade, and would not be bound first
to tender back the money received, or to do any other act in disaffirm-
ance of the contract; but such action must be brought upon the ex-
press contract; and that no other or different contract can be implied
while that is in force and the rights of the parties dependent upon it:
Hurst v. Sackett, 30 or 31 Mich.
Held, 2. That the existence of the chattel-mortgage as an encumbrance
on the horse, and the taking of the property under it, would, though the
exchange had been executed, authorize the plaintiff to rescind the con-
tract, and by returning the money received he would, it seems, have had
a right to sue, either upon the contract, or for goods sold and delivered;
but that this is upon the ground that the contract being rescinded there
is no express contract existing, and the law will imply one; and that
while the original contract remained in force none can be implied: Id.
Hed, 3. That there was not a total failure of consideration as there
was no defect of title to the $10 received ; and that the plaintiff is not,
therefore, entitled to treat the contract as rescinded while he keeps part
of the consideration: Id.
Held, 4. That the real nature of the plaintiff's right of action is one
for damages for the breach of that portion of the defendant's contract
which warranted against a failure of title to the horse: Id.
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It did not appear that the horse had been sold under the chattel-
mortgage, and there was other property covered by and taken upon the
mortgage, the value of which was not shown. .eild, That the evidence
fails to show the real amount of the encumbrance on the horse, or the
value of the other property taken on the mortgage; that the plaintiff
had a right to redeem at any time before he was deprived of possession
and even within any reasonable time thereafter; and that the value of
the horse and colt traded to defendant could in no event upon such evi-
dence constitute the measure-of damages : Id.
SHIPPING. See Navigable Waters.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See Deed.
STOCK. See Broker.
STREET. See Municipal Corporation.
SURETY.
When the taking of a Mortgage to secure t1hePayment of a Prom issory
.Note does not suspend the Remedy on the .ote.-The principal in a
joint and several promissory note, after the same matured, executed
and delivered to the payee therein, a mortgage of real estate to secure
the payment of a certain sum of money, the amount of the note being
included and referred to as secured by note; the mortgage contained a
covenant on the part of the mortgagor to pay the money on a day
therein named, but no provision that the right of action on the note
should be suspended. Held, That the acceptance of the mortgage,
which was merely additional or collateral security, did not extinguish or
suspend the remedy on the note, and the liability of the surety thereon
was not discharged : Brengle v. Bushey, 40 Md.
Notice to Landlord to terminate Lease.-A lease was for a year, either
party might determine the lease at the end of the term by giving a
month's previous notice to the other. A surety for the lessee gave due
notice to the lessor to collect the rent from the lessee and that he would
not be bound beyond the end of the current year, the lessee held over,
the surety died before the end of the succeeding year. Held, That his
estate was not liable for rent during that year: Pleasonton & Biddle's
Appeal, 75 Pa.
It was inequitable to the surety to continue the tenant for another
year after the notice : Id.
Though a surety cannot. at will discharge himself from his contract,
yet equity often relieves a surety when the principal would not be re-
lieved : Id.
TAXATION. See Evidence.
Exemption.-Intention must be Clear.-To exempt any particular
property from taxation the intention must be clear. Bonds issued by
the city of Paterson, under a special act (Laws, 1873, p. 24,) to meet an
unexpected contingency, not provided for in the charter, and without
being exempted by the act, are not exempted by a clause in the charter
of 1869, (Laws 1869, p. 768,) in these words : " that the bonds author-
ized to be issued by the mayor and aldermen shall be issued free and
